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ACHIEVEMENTS, LUCK AND VALUE
Duncan Pritchard
1. Achievements: A First Pass
Achievements are clearly something that we care about.
We want a life rich in achievements, and we value the
achievements of others. To be appointed to the job of one’s
dreams as a result of one’s hard work and raw talent, such
that it constitutes an achievement on one’s part, is far more
satisfying and worthy than getting it through other means
where no achievement is involved (e.g. as a result of nepo-
tism). Similarly, the Olympic goal medal winner who gets
her award by being the best in a strong field exhibits an
achievement and is lauded for it, but her counterpart who
attains the same result through, say, mere good luck (e.g.
none of her competitors is able to compete due to injury),
and who thus does not exhibit an achievement, is not
gifted nearly as much praise. But what is an achievement,
and what is it about achievements that makes us care
about them so much?
Note first that an essential ingredient of achievements is
that they involve success. Failure may be glorious, but it
does not involve an achievement. This point is easy to
miss, since the most glorious failures often do involve
related achievements. For example, that you came second
in a 100 metre sprint means that you cannot exhibit the
achievement of being the race winner. But that doesn’t
mean that you don’t thereby exhibit any number of related
achievements. Perhaps, say, you have overcome a signifi-
cant injury in order to race this day. If so, then that you
came second may well constitute an achievement on your
part. Or perhaps you recorded your personal best time in
this race. If so, then this would also be an achievement on
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your part. The point remains, however, that you cannot
exhibit the achievement of winning the race if you fail to
win the race.
Clearly, however, success does not suffice for an
achievement, since success can be attained in all kinds of
ways, not all of them suitable for bona fide achievements.
In particular, one can be successful through brute luck –
e.g. as when all of one’s competitors in a sprint race
succumb to injury – and in such cases being successful
does not constitute an achievement. There is a related
point to be made here, which is that achievements involve
the exercise of the relevant abilities. That is, your abilities
should be playing a role in enabling you to be successful,
rather than the success in question being due just to blind
fortune. Winning the sprint because you are the fastest
person in the field is part of what constitutes the relevant
achievement; winning the race as the slowest person in the
field, albeit the only one who doesn’t pull up with an injury,
doesn’t come close.
So achievements involve both successes and the exer-
cise of one’s relevant abilities. Does this suffice as an
account of achievement? Interestingly, it doesn’t, and the
reason for this is that one can imagine cases where there
is both success and the relevant ability being exhibited,
and yet where the success is nonetheless due to dumb
luck.
In order to see this, imagine the case of an archer, who
we’ll call ‘Archie’. Archie has all the relevant archery abil-
ities, and using those abilities he fires an arrow at a target
and hits the target. He is thus successful and also exhibit-
ing the relevant abilities. Does this suffice to exhibit an
achievement? No. In order to see this, notice that it is quite
compatible with how we have described this case that the
success in question could be due to luck rather than
Archie’s archery abilities. Suppose, for example, that a freak
gust of wind blows the arrow off-course and then a second
freak gust of wind blows it back on course again.1 Would
we regard Archie’s success as an achievement? Surely not.
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If our account of achievements is to exclude this kind of
luck, then we must add a further clause to our account
which specifies the way in which the success is attained. In
particular what we want is an account of achievements
which demands that one’s success should be because of
the exercise of one’s relevant abilities, in the sense that
this success is primarily creditable to this exercise of ability
rather than to some other factor which is external to one’s
agency (like dumb luck). The addition of this clause deals
with the case of Archie because his success is precisely
not creditable to his archery abilities, even though it is
undeniable that he is manifesting them, but is rather credi-
table to the luck that the gusts of wind cancelled each
other out in the way that they did. In contrast, we can
imagine an analogue to the Archie case in which no luck is
involved. In this case Archie’s success would be primarily
creditable to his abilities. It would also straightforwardly
count as an achievement on this account, just as it should.
We will say more about how achievements should be
understood in a moment, but first let us ask why we care
about achievements on this account of them. For what is
undeniable is that we do care about achievements, and so
any account of this notion ought to be able to explain this
fact. If one doubts this, then consider the following two
options: a life in which one achieves the most fundamental
goals of one’s life (one has a fulfilling marriage, one raises
happy well-adjusted children, one is successful at work,
and so on) versus a life which is subjectively indistinguish-
able and yet where the successes in question are simply
due to luck (one’s apparently fulfilling marriage is based on
a lie, but luck means that this has never come to light,
one’s apparent success at work is a sham, the result of
others covering for your inadequacies, and so on). Isn’t the
former kind of life so much more preferable to the latter
kind of life, even though it will be experientially the same?2
If that’s right, however, then it seems that achievements
have a special kind of value. In particular, it seems to strongly
suggest that achievements are non-instrumentally – or
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finally – valuable, in the sense that they are valuable for their
own sakes rather than merely being valuable as a means to a
further valuable end. After all, given that the two lives
described above are experientially the same, then it seems
there can be no practical difference between the two lives.
That is, from the point of view of getting what one wants, either
life is just as good (since from one’s own point of view they are
the same life). And yet the life rich in achievement is intuitively
so much better. The value of achievements, then, cannot it
seems be just an instrumental value. Put another way, while
achievements are undoubtedly typically of great instrumental
value – one often gets plaudits for one’s achievements after
all – the value of achievements is not exhausted by this instru-
mental value.
If achievements are finally valuable, however, then that
puts them among pretty exalted company, since very little that
we value is finally valuable. The good, whatever that is, is cer-
tainly finally valuable. Other plausible candidates include
friendship, beauty, truth, wisdom and virtue, but not much
else. If achievements are valuable for their own sake, then
that means that they are a very special kind of thing indeed.
2. Achievements: A Closer Look
Here again is our rough account of achievements, stated
a little more formally:
Achievement (I)
An achievement is a success that is because of the exer-
cise of one’s relevant abilities (rather than due to some
factor external to one’s agency, such as luck).3
The questions in hand for this account of achievement
are twofold: (i) is this a good account of achievement, and
(ii) can this account of achievement accommodate our intui-
tion that achievements are finally valuable. As we will see,
these issues are inter-related.
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Here is one problem that faces this account of achieve-
ment as it stands. For notice that by the lights of this
account some very easy successes count as achieve-
ments. Take, for instance, raising one’s arm in normal cir-
cumstances. This is certainly a success, and it is also
certainly a success that is because of the exercise of one’s
relevant abilities. But is it an achievement? This seems too
strong, for achievements are not that easy. A related
problem here is that if achievements are this easy then it is
hard to see why we would intuitively regard them as finally
valuable. What, after all, is so finally valuable about lifting
one’s arm? Call this the problem of easy achievements.
This is not to say that all achievements are difficult. After
all, when Tiger Woods sinks a put with ease, or when
Rafael Nadal hits a winning shot with no trouble at all, we
would certainly regard the successes in question as
achievements, even though they are, for them at any rate,
easy successes. Moreover, if achievements are finally valu-
able at all, then the successes attained by Tiger Woods and
Rafael Nadal in these cases are certainly finally valuable.
So what is going on here? Why are some easy successes
achievements, and hence in the market for final value, and
some not?
I think the answer to this question lies in the fact that we
have a bifurcated conception of achievements. In particular,
I suggest that we need to replace the simple account of
achievements set out above with the following more compli-
cated account:
Achievements (II)
An achievement is a success that is either: (i) because
of the exercise, to a particularly significant level, of one’s
relevant abilities; or which is (ii) because of the exercise of
one’s relevant abilities (rather than due to some factor
external to one’s agency, such as luck) and which
involves the overcoming of a significant obstacle to that
success.
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In order to see the attraction of such a modified account
of achievement, notice how it deals with the problem posed
by the easy achievements of Tiger Woods and Rafael
Nadal. For while the respective achievements are easy for
them, they are only easy because of the exercise of such a
great level of skill in attaining this achievement. Thus,
these successes qualify as achievements because they
satisfy the first condition of this account of achievement.
In contrast, in cases where no great skill is on display
then the overcoming of a significant obstacle to success is
vital if it is to count as an achievement. In order to see this,
notice that while simply raising one’s arm (in normal cir-
cumstances) does not qualify as an achievement, it could
qualify as an achievement if there were some significant
obstacle to this success. If, for example, one had hurt
one’s arm in a car accident, such that one had consider-
able difficulty raising it, then raising it could constitute an
achievement. In the former case, the easy success does
not count as an achievement since there is neither a signifi-
cant level of skill on display nor the overcoming of a signifi-
cant obstacle which stands in the way of one’s success. In
the latter case, however, the success in question could
constitute an achievement because there is a significant
obstacle to that success. The agent would thus satisfy the
second condition of this account of achievement.
Notice too that it is far more plausible that this account of
achievements can accommodate the intuition that achieve-
ments are finally valuable. For while we surely have no intui-
tion at all that easy achievements of the sort exhibited by
raising one’s arm in normal circumstances are finally valu-
able, it is far more plausible to suppose that the highly skilful
achievements of Tiger Woods and Rafael Nadal, or the
obstacle-overcoming achievement of someone injured raising
their aim, do constitute successes that are finally valuable.
Still, there is a problem remaining for the new account, at
least insofar as it is meant to be both an adequate account
of achievements and also an account which can accommo-
date the putative final value of achievements. The problem
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relates to the fact that some ‘achievements’, on this
account anyway, don’t seem to be finally valuable because
they seem to be inherently ‘bad’. For a vivid illustration of
this, consider the many highly skilful successes of a tyrant
like Hitler or Stalin. Take, for example, Hitler’s success in
seizing effective absolute power through a series of political
executions in the so-called ‘night of the long knives’. Here
we have a success that is certainly due both to the exhibition
of a significant level of the relevant skills and which also
involves the overcoming of a relevant obstacle – indeed
many potential obstacles – to that success. But even if
we are willing to consider this success an achievement on
Hitler’s part, we would certainly not be willing to consider
such a success as finally valuable. Call this the problem of
wicked achievements.
There are two ways that one might respond to this
problem, both of which can plausibly rescue the account of
achievements in hand. The first is to take the problem
head-on and argue that while it is in the nature of achieve-
ments to be finally valuable, this is consistent with the fact
that not all achievements are finally valuable. That is,
perhaps some achievements, like wicked achievements,
lack final value. This is not as odd as it might at first
sound. Consider, for example, a claim such as that tigers
are fierce. This statement seems true. Moreover, notice that
this claim does not seem to be at all undermined by the
fact that there are tame tigers in the world who are not
fierce at all. In particular, in saying that tigers are fierce we
are not making a claim about all tigers but rather making a
claim about the nature of tigers – a fortiori, we are making
a claim about how tigers would behave in normal
circumstances.4
With this point in mind, one option is to bite the bullet on
the problem of wicked achievements and argue that in
saying that achievements are finally valuable one is not
thereby saying that all achievements are finally valuable but
rather saying something akin to the claim made when we
say that tigers are fierce. That is, that it is in some sense in
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the nature of achievements to be finally valuable, even
though not all achievements are finally valuable.
An alternative, and possibly more hard-nosed, way of
responding to this problem is to argue that contrary to
appearances all achievements are finally valuable, it is just
that the value in question is overridden by other factors. An
analogy here might be beauty. That something is beautiful
is, we might argue, always a consideration in favour of it,
even though this value can be overridden by other factors.
If saving a child’s life depends upon throwing the only copy
of Turner’s masterpiece ‘Rain, Steam and Speed’ into the
fire, then one should do so, since a child’s life is clearly
more important than a painting. Note, however, that in
saying this one is not thereby saying that this painting has
no value, much less that it is not finally valuable. Rather,
one is merely saying that its value, great as it is, has been
overridden by the greater value of the child’s life.
In a nutshell, the distinction in play here is between prima
facie and specifically pro tanto value. The former kind of
value can, in effect, be undermined, such that it no longer in
fact applies. To say that achievements are (finally) valuable
on this reading is to say that they are usually valuable in
normal circumstances, but that they sometimes aren’t (i.e.
when the value is undermined). This is the kind of value that
achievements have if they are to be thought of along the
lines of the claim that tigers are fierce. In contrast, on the
latter kind of value, the value is always generated, it is just
that it is sometimes overridden by other factors. So, for
example, that something is beautiful is always a consider-
ation in its favour, even if sometimes the all things considered
value of a beautiful thing is quite low, perhaps negligible or of
negative value, because of other factors (e.g. that a child’s
life depends on the destruction of the artefact in question).
Some things certainly are of pro tanto value in this way,
and finally valuable things seem to be an obvious case in
point in this respect. If we had to destroy a beautiful art
work because a child’s life depended on it, then while we
would no doubt grant that this was the right thing to do all
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things considered, we would surely also recognise that in
destroying this art work we are destroying something pre-
cious, something of final value. That is, we would recognise
that we are destroying something of final value whose
value has not been neutralised by the value of the child’s
life (even though we recognise that the child’s life should
take precedence over the value of the art work).
We do not need to take a view as regards these two
kinds of response to the problem of wicked achievements
here. The important point is that either would constitute a
solid response to this problem on behalf of the new
account of achievements on offer and hence the proposal
is not fatally wounded by this problem.
3. Achievements and Luck
We noted earlier that achievements are, in a certain
sense at least, immune to luck. That is, when one’s
success qualifies as an achievement then it is not down to
luck. This is certainly true, but I want to close by noting
that we need to qualify the claim made here in an important
respect. This is because there is a kind of luck which,
rather surprisingly, is entirely compatible with achievements.
As noted earlier, it is not enough for an achievement that
one be both successful and in addition relevantly skilful,
since this way of thinking about achievements is compatible
with the success in question being nonetheless due to
dumb luck (as in the Archie case we described where the
two freak gusts of wind cancelled each other out). Adding
the ‘because of’ relation to the account excludes success
that is due to dumb luck of this sort, and hence rescues
the proposal. Interestingly, however, the addition of this
relation doesn’t exclude a second type of luck that could
play a role in one’s success. Consider the following vari-
ation on the Archie case. This time we suppose that there
are no freak gusts of wind or anything like that. Instead,
Archie simply picks out a target, skilfully fires at that target,
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and hits the target. The twist in the tail in this story,
however, is that of the targets that Archie chose from, every
one bar the target he actually chose contains, unbeknownst
to him, a forcefield that would repel an arrow were one fired
at it.
What’s interesting about this case, so described, is that
we have no hesitation in describing Archie’s success as an
achievement. After all, it really is because of his archery
abilities that he hit the target, unlike the case involving the
freak gusts of wind where the success seems more attribu-
table to dumb luck. In a very general sense, however, both
cases involve lucky successes. It’s true in both cases, for
example, that Archie could so very easily had been unsuc-
cessful (i.e. had the second gust of wind not come along
as it did, or had he chosen a different target). So why are
we happy with the fact that an achievement is exhibited in
the one case but not the other?
I think the answer lies in the fact there are two kinds of
luck in play here. The first is an ‘intervening’ kind of luck
where something actually gets between the agent’s abilities
and the target success. This is the kind of luck in play when
the two gusts of wind do their work. Luck of this sort is
incompatible with achievements, since it entails that the
success in question was not because of the exercise of the
agent’s abilities but rather down to luck. The second kind of
luck – the one in play when all the other targets are fitted
with forcefields – is very different, however, in that it does
not ‘intervene’ in this way. Instead, it is of a purely ‘environ-
mental’ type. Instead, the luck in question specifically con-
cerns the fact that this is a pretty unfriendly environment in
terms of making a successful shot (whatever one’s ability).
As luck would have it, however, Archie was not affected by
this and hence skilfully hit the target nonetheless.
Although the claim that environmental luck is compatible
with achievement might be initially surprising, it does
become more plausible on closer inspection. Consider
another example. Suppose our agent, let’s call her ‘Viola’,
is a fantastic violinist. Imagine that Viola successfully
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undertakes a performance of a tricky piece of music and
pulls it off with aplomb. Here is the twist in the tail.
Suppose that unbeknownst to Viola the room she is stand-
ing in is surrounded by water, and it is just pure luck that
this water did not break through the walls during her per-
formance and prevent her from continuing. In the relevant
sense, then, her success is lucky, in that she could very
easily have been unsuccessful. But still, the fact remains
that the water didn’t impede her performance, just as the
forcefields didn’t affect Archie’s shot, and hence it follows
that she does exhibit a bona fide achievement in this case.
What the compatibility of environmental luck and
achievement demonstrates is that it can be a matter of luck
that one is in a position to exhibit an achievement, but that
this does not entail that it is any less of an achievement.
In this specific sense, then, achievements can be lucky.5,6
Duncan Pritchard is Chair in Epistemology at the
University of Edinburgh. duncan.pritchard@ed.ac.uk
Notes
1 This kind of case is in effect a variant of a ‘Gettier’
example, albeit applied outside epistemology. See Gettier ‘Is
Justified True Belief Knowledge?’.
2 A related intuition is elicited by Nozick’s (Anarchy, State,
and Utopia, 42–5) ‘experience machine’ – viz., that experien-
tially identical lives can be very different in terms of their value
due to external factors. In Nozick’s example, the issue is
whether one is genuinely living the life that one takes oneself
to be living rather than a ‘fake’ life in which one is, unbe-
knownst to one, being ‘fed’ one’s experiences by the experi-
ence machine. Interestingly, note that what is missing from the
fake life in this thought experiment is the kind of achievements
that are available to the agent who is not hooked up to the
experience machine. Thus, one can, in part at least, account
for the distinction that Nozick is drawing by appeal to the value
of achievements.
3 Greco (in ‘The Value Probem’) defends a version of this
account of achievement, as part of his account of knowledge,
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though note that the general idea of thinking of knowledge
along the sort of lines that it would qualify as an achievement
originates in Sosa (e.g. Knowledge in Perspective). See also
Sosa (Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, passim). Note that
there are competing ways of reading the ‘because of’ in play in
this account of achievement – with Greco and Sosa each
offering different analyses – but it would take us too far afield
to explore this issue further here. Accordingly, for our purposes
this relation is to be read intuitively. For a comparative discus-
sion of the main ways of understanding this relation, see
Haddock, Millar & Pritchard, The Value of Knowledge and
Pritchard ‘Knowledge and Virtue: Response to Kelp’.
4 This example was suggested to me by John Turri.
5 For more on the notion of luck, see Pritchard, Epistemic
Luck. For a more detailed discussion of the distinction between
environmental and intervening luck, see Pritchard, ‘Radical
Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Value’.
6 This paper was written while in receipt of a Philip
Leverhulme Prize.
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